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Introduction 
An expectant mother jolts awake as a sharp pain rips through her 
stomach. She feels the warm sensation of blood spreading down her leg, 
her hands frantically grasp her stomach as another contraction tears 
through her. Her inhuman wail pierces the night air and tears stream 
down her face as she realizes her worst nightmare is coming true; she is 
having a miscarriage.1 She has lost the child she has wanted for so long, 
 
1. See, e.g., Miscarriage, Am. Pregnancy Ass’n, http://americanpregnancy. 
org/pregnancy-complications/miscarriage/ [https://perma.cc/NST5-JXND] 
(last updated Dec. 5, 2017) (listing the symptoms of miscarriage). 
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less than forty-eight hours after having an amniocentesis to test for fetal 
abnormalities.2 
Miscarriage is one of a multitude of serious complications expectant 
mothers must weigh when deciding if they should have an 
amniocentesis.3 To determine if her child has any number of genetic 
abnormalities, an expectant mother would have a long needle inserted 
into her stomach, the needle would penetrate the uterus and amniotic 
sac, and extract amniotic fluid for testing.4 This amniocentesis 
procedure carries serious risk of miscarriage, needle injury to the fetus, 
fetal infection, and other complications.5 
Today, a revolutionary breakthrough in prenatal care means 
women no longer have to struggle to decide between important fetal 
testing and the catastrophic risks associated with amniocentesis. Drs. 
Lo and Wainscoat discovered that maternal plasma and serum, which 
had previously been discarded as medical waste, contained cell-free fetal 
DNA (cffDNA).6 Lo and Wainscoat were able to develop a method to 
detect the small fraction of paternally inherited cffDNA in maternal 
plasma to determine fetal abnormalities.7 This breakthrough has 
revolutionized prenatal care, offering women a safe alternative to high-
risk, invasive testing; cffDNA testing is now offered in over ninety 
countries and is on track to be a first-tier prenatal screen for all 
pregnant women.8 
There is no doubt that Lo and Wainscoat’s invention has 
revolutionized prenatal care.9 The Supreme Court’s current patent-
 
2. See Amniocentesis, NHS, https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/amniocentesis/ 
risks/ [https://perma.cc/BS4P-DSVD] (last updated Apr. 21, 2016) (stating 
that most miscarriages due to amniocentesis occur less than three days after 
the procedure is done). 
3. See Amniocentesis Risks, Mayo Clinic, https://www.mayoclinic.org/ 
tests-procedures/amniocentesis/about/pac-20392914 [https://perma.cc/ 
F4CH-FTSK] (last updated Nov. 8, 2018). 
4. See Amniocentesis, John Hopkins Med., https://www.hopkinsmedicine. 
org/healthlibrary/test_procedures/gynecology/amniocentesis_procedure
_92,P07762 [https://perma.cc/2YXW-K2XE] (last visited Jan. 19, 2019) 
(explaining what happens during an amniocentesis). 
5. Mayo Clinic, supra note 3. 
6. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 
2015). 
7. Id. 
8. Robert Cook-Deegan & Subhashini Chandrasekharan, Sequenom v. 
Ariosa—The Death of a Genetic Testing Patent, 375 New Eng. J. Med. 
2418, 2418 (2016). 
9. See Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1379. 
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eligibility test, the Mayo/Alice two-step,10 however, threatens the 
future of such ground breaking inventions. The Mayo/Alice two-step 
analysis of patent eligibility first requires a determination of whether 
the claims at issue are directed to a law of nature, natural phenomenon, 
or abstract idea.11 If the claims are directed to one of these patent-
ineligible concepts, the second step of the analysis determines if there 
is an “inventive concept.”12 The Court described an inventive concept 
as “an element or combination of elements that ‘is sufficient to ensure 
that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent 
upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’”13 
The Mayo/Alice two-step has proven to be unworkable and has 
resulted in significant uncertainty in biotechnology. The test has been 
described as “being both indeterminate, as no one is certain how it will 
be applied in any particular case, and overly restrictive,” as the test has 
been applied to invalidate a wide range of patents.14 As a result of the 
Mayo/Alice test, a large number of life-saving, meritorious inventions 
are being rejected or invalidated for being directed towards patent-
ineligible subject matter.15 The uncertainty surrounding biotechnology 
patent protection has significantly contributed to the weakening of the 
U.S. patent system16 and has led to one commentator calling the Mayo 
decision “the worst, most wrongly decided case by the Supreme Court 
 
10. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012); 
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); see Patent Subject 
Matter Eligibility, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/ 
s2106.html [https://perma.cc/U4F4-2UMJ] (last modified Jan. 24, 2018) 
(referring to the “Alice/Mayo two-part test”). 
11. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
14. Kevin Madigan & Adam Mossoff, Turning Gold into Lead: How Patent 
Eligibility Doctrine Is Undermining U.S. Leadership in Innovation, 24 
Geo. Mason L. Rev. 939, 952 (2017). 
15. See Bernard Chao, USPTO is Rejecting Potentially Life-Saving 
Inventions, Law360 (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.law360.com/articles/ 
604808/uspto-is-rejecting-potentially-life-saving-inventions [https://perma.cc/ 
DW8W-5P79]. 
16. See Gene Quinn, The Top 3 Reasons the U.S. Patent System in Decline, 
IPWatchdog (Apr. 26, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/04/ 
26/top-3-reasons-u-s-patent-system-decline/id=82571/ [https://perma.cc/ 
VZ9F-6UV5] (stating that, in 2017, the United States fell to a tenth-place 
tie with Hungary in the U.S. Chamber of Commerce world rankings for 
patent protection, and listing uncertainty in patent eligibility as a 
significant contributing factor to the decline in the strength to the U.S. 
patent system). 
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in the patent field ever.”17 Without a change to the current Mayo/Alice 
two-step approach to determining patent-eligible subject matter, the 
Supreme Court risks hindering the development of innovations, the very 
thing the patent system seeks to protect.18 
Part I of this Note discusses why a strong U.S. patent system is 
crucial to the advancement of biotechnology and medical innovation. 
Parts II and III explore the development of the modern patent statute 
and the inconsistent judicial treatment of the eligible subject matter 
requirement. Parts IV and V describe the Mayo/Alice two-step and the 
effects of the test on patent eligibility. Part VI discusses the rise in the 
dismissal of claims based on motions to dismiss since the adoption of 
the Mayo/Alice two-step. Part VII compares the Vanda decision and 
the Mayo decision. Part VIII details the consequences of leaving the 
Mayo/Alice two-step intact. Part IX of this Note discusses the current 
push for overturning the Mayo/Alice test through statutory 
amendment and details why this is not an adequate solution. Finally, 
the Conclusion develops a new test for determining what constitutes 
patent-eligible subject matter and highlights the benefits of the 
proposed test. 
I. The Need for a Strong U.S. Patent System 
Patents have been a driving force behind innovation in the United 
States since the country’s founding. Patent rights, considered 
fundamental by the Framers, are recognized in the Intellectual Property 
Clause of the Constitution.19 The Framers believed patent rights to be 
so critical to the success of the United States that the only mention of 
the word “right” in the original Constitution is found in that clause.20 
The original patent statute was passed in the Second Session of the 
First Congress.21 Abraham Lincoln, a patent holder himself, recognized 
 
17. Gene Quinn, Mayo v. Prometheus: A Lawless Decision by an Omnipotent 
Court Wreaking Havoc on Patents, IPWatchdog (Jan. 23, 2017), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/01/23/mayo-v-prometheus-lawless-
decision-wreaking-havoc-patents/id=77438/ [https://perma.cc/PB5Y-AS49]. 
18. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power to issue patents 
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”). 
19. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Gene Quinn, Patents, Copyrights and the 
Constitution, Perfect Together, IPWatchdog (Feb. 19, 2018), http:// 
www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/02/19/patents-copyrights-constitution/id= 
93941/ [https://perma.cc/NC2K-EQGT]. 
20. Quinn, supra note 19. 
21. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (“[P]romot[ing] the progress of 
useful Arts . . . .”); Quinn, supra note 19. 
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that “[t]he patent system . . . added the fuel of interest to the fire of 
genius, in the discovery and production of new and useful things.”22 
Patent protection has played a major role in the development of 
some of the most prominent and ground-breaking inventions in the 
United States.23 Patent rights are intended to “promote the Progress of 
Science and useful arts.”24 By granting an inventor a limited right of 
exclusion, patent law provides incentive for inventors to risk the 
enormous costs involved in developing new technologies. This incentive 
promotes the development of new technologies, and has a positive 
impact on society.25 To obtain this limited right of exclusion, an 
inventor must provide an adequate disclosure of the claimed invention.26 
Patent law thus encourages inventors to disclose their inventions to the 
public, rather than maintain them in secret for their own benefit. Such 
public disclosure stimulates ideas and leads to the eventual 
development of further significant advances in technology.27 
In a strong patent system, patent rights are granted to particular 
inventions in a predictable manner, and patent infringement similarly 
is enforced in a predictable manner. A predictable patent system 
provides inventors with the ability to protect their rewards for 
successful inventions and to make educated decisions on where to 
allocate resources when developing new technologies.28 
The United States has long been considered to have the “gold 
standard” patent system and to be the world leader in securing patent 
protection for innovative, next-wave technologies.29 The United States 
developed its “gold standard” patent system “precisely because it 
consistently secured legal protections for the fruits of inventors’ labor.”30 
 
22. Abraham Lincoln, Second Lecture on Discoveries and Inventions (1858–
59), in Abraham Lincoln Online (original emphasis omitted), http:// 
www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/discoveries.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/V82V-7AMB] (last visited Jan. 20, 2019). 
23. Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at The 
Economic Contribution of Technology Licensing Conference: The Case for 
a Strong Patent System 4 (June 8, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/ 
files/documents/public_statements/958603/160608strongpatentsystem.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/87SA-SCCT]. 
24. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
25. Kewanne Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974). 
26. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012); Kewanne, 416 U.S. at 480–81. 
27. Kewanne, 416 U.S. at 481. 
28. Richard S. Gruner, Why We Need a Strong Patent System and When: 
Filling the Void Left by the Bilski Case, 28 Santa Clara Computer & 
High Tech. L.J. 499, 543 (2011). 
29. Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 14, at 942. 
30. Id. 
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In the 1980s, when other countries were hesitating to grant patent 
protection to cutting-edge innovations in the emerging, highly 
controversial field of biotechnology, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
theses biotechnology innovations should be promoted and protected.31 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Diamond v. Chakrabarty32 recognized 
that the results of biotechnology research may be directed to eligible 
subject matter.33 The Chakrabarty decision has been cited by 
commentators as a driving force behind revolutionary advances in life 
science technology and medical treatment.34 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Chakrabarty, Harvard 
College secured a patent on the oncomouse.35 The oncomouse is a mouse 
that has been genetically modified to incorporate a cancer-promoting 
gene into its genome,36 resulting in a multitude of opportunities to 
research cancer development and treatment.37 While the United States 
issued a patent on the oncomouse approximately four years after the 
initial filing of the patent application,38 other countries, such as Canada, 
rejected the application outright. The oncomouse patent was subject to 
a long series of rejections, court appeals, and remands before the 
European Patent Office ultimately granted the patent in 2004, nearly 
two decades after the issuance of the U.S. patent.39 Europe’s delay in 
granting patent protection gave the United States the edge in the 
biotechnology field. By securing patent rights in biotechnology 
inventions early on, the United States “became the birthplace of the 
biotech revolution” while Europe lost the “competitive and commercial 
edge in biotechnology.”40 
II. The Development of the Modern Patent Statute 
In order to obtain a patent, an inventor must file an application 
with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) that 
 
31. Id. at 943–44. 
32. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
33. See infra Part III(B) (discussing the Chakrabarty approach to eligible 
subject matter). 
34. Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 14, at 943. 
35. U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (issued Apr. 12, 1988). 
36. Id. at col. 1 ll. 30–56. 
37. Id. at col. 3 ll. 16–59. 
38. See ‘866 Patent (showing a filing date of June 22, 1984 and an issuance 
date of April 12, 1988). 
39. Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 14, at 944. 
40. Id. 
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meets several requirements.41 The patent application is then examined 
by the USPTO to determine if the application meets the statutory 
requirements laid out in the patent statute.42 
The modern patent framework was adopted in the Patent Act of 
1952.43 Prior to the 1952 Patent Act, the statutory requirements for 
patentability were concise and grouped into only two statutory 
sections.44 The Patent Act of 1952 organized the statutory requirements 
into their present, individual sections. The specification requirement 
necessitates that the specification “contain a written description of the 
invention . . . in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable 
any person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use 
the same.”45 This requirement also mandates that “[t]he specification 
shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and 
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor . . . regards 
as the invention.”46 The invention must also be novel47 and non-obvious 
to a person having ordinary skill in the art.48 
Additionally, an invention must satisfy the eligibility requirement 
of section 101 to be considered patentable.49 Section 101 of the patent 
statute provides: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor . . . .”50 
Thus, to satisfy the eligibility requirement an invention must possess 
utility and be directed to eligible subject matter. The eligibility 
requirement is also referred to as patent-eligibility or the patent-eligible 
subject matter requirement. 
The legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act reveals that section 
101 merely identifies subject matter that may be patented, if the other 
 
41. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2012). 
42. See Patent Process Overview, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-
getting-started/patent-basics/types-patent-applications/utility-patent/ 
patent-process-0 [https://perma.cc/GB3B-LXYE] (last modified Nov. 24, 
2014) (outlining the process for obtaining a patent). 
43. Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 1–390 (2012)). 
44. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7 §§ 1–2, 1 Stat. 109 (“[P]romot[ing] the progress 
of useful Arts . . . .”) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 100–105 
(2012)). 
45. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). 
46. § 112(b). 
47. § 102. 
48. § 103. 
49. § 101. 
50. § 101. 
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statutory requirements of the patent statute, such as novelty, are 
satisfied. Furthermore, “the drafters explained that while [section] 101 
would still include the word ‘new,’ [section] 102 [novelty] provides ‘in 
effect, an amplification and definition of “new” in [section] 101.’”51 
Satisfaction of section 101 alone is, therefore, not sufficient to grant 
an invention patent protection. After an invention satisfies the 
eligibility requirement, it must still be found to be novel and non-
obvious as compared to prior art. To evaluate if an invention is patent 
eligible, one must understand the role of each section of the Patent Act 
and view each requirement in the context of the patent statute as a 
whole. It is not the sole job of section 101 to eliminate patentability for 
unmeritorious claims. Consequently, “there is no need to twist the 
language of [section] 101 for policy reasons to ensure that unmeritorious 
inventions are not patentable.”52 Rather, section 101 was meant to be 
the first stepping stone in determining if an invention is patent eligible. 
However, case law has imposed more stringent restrictions on 
patent-eligible subject matter. Since the 1800s, courts have recognized 
exceptions to what subject matter is considered patent eligible. 
Notably, laws of nature, natural phenomena, mental steps, and 
mathematical algorithms are not considered to be directed to patent-
eligible subject matter.53 Courts have struggled, however, with 
determining what is a patent-eligible invention and an unpatentable 
principle since the beginning of the patent system.54 This struggle has 
led the Supreme Court to take conflicting approaches to analyzing 
patent eligibility over the years.55 
 
51. David O. Taylor, Confusing Patent Eligibility, 84 Tenn. L. Rev. 157, 173 
(2016). 
52. Id. at 175. 
53. Michael Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 Tenn. L. Rev. 591, 596 
(2008) (citing multiple sources). 
54. Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Inventive Application: A History, 67 Fla. L. Rev. 565, 
566 (2015). 
55. See, e.g., Michael A. Sanzo, Patent Eligibility in Biotechnology: A Look 
Under the Hood, 45 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 2 (2017) [hereinafter Sanzo, Patent 
Eligibility]; Michael A. Sanzo, The Patenting of Gene Based Diagnostic 
Assays in a Post Mayo and Myriad World, 16 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. 
Prop. L. 1 (2016) (discussing the Supreme Court’s inconsistent treatment 
of patent-eligible subject matter in different cases). 
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III. Judicial Treatment of Eligible Subject Matter 
The Supreme Court’s conflicting approach to the eligibility 
requirement is exemplified in Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant 
Co.56 and Diamond v. Chakrabarty.57 
A. Funk Brothers Approach to Eligible Subject Matter 
The Funk Brothers approach to analyzing patent eligible subject 
matter begins with analyzing each element of a claim individually to 
determine if the element encompasses an abstract idea, natural 
phenomenon, or law of nature. If one of these judicial exceptions is 
present in any individual element of the claim, the court determines if 
any other element of the claim conveys an inventive concept.58 This 
approach to analyzing eligible subject matter has essentially been 
adopted by the Supreme Court in its Mayo/Alice framework.59 
The patent at issue in Funk Brothers claimed an inoculant 
comprised of a variety of different bacteria that had been individually 
isolated and recombined based on their compatibility.60 The claimed 
inoculant was able to infect various types of leguminous plants and fix 
nitrogen to promote the plants’ growth.61 
While the Funk Brothers case was decided prior to the adoption of 
the modern patent statute, the Court’s analysis seems to be clearly 
directed to patent eligibility.62 The Court found the patent claims at 
issue unpatentable, and therefore invalid, because “[t]heir qualities are 
the work of nature.”63 The qualities of the claimed bacteria were, the 
Court reasoned, “part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men. They 
are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved 
exclusively to none.”64 The Court further found that a discovery of a 
law of nature only results in an invention if the law of nature is applied 
to “a new and useful end.”65 
As the opinion continues, however, the Court’s focus on patent 
eligible subject matter begins to overlap with the requirements of 
 
56. 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
57. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
58. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130. 
59. Sanzo, Patent Eligibility, supra note 55, at 2. 
60. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 129–30. 
61. Id. at 128–29. 
62. Sanzo, Patent Eligibility, supra note 55, at 5. 
63. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
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novelty and non-obviousness. The Court found that the combination of 
the bacteria claimed did not result in any species of bacteria acquiring 
a different use and that each species maintained its original function.66 
This analysis seems to be directed to the concept of non-obviousness. 
An invention is obvious if it is a “combination of familiar elements 
according to known methods” that “does no more than yield predictable 
results.”67 The Court goes on to analyze the novelty of the claimed 
bacteria combination, noting that while new, the claimed combination 
was still unpatentable.68 The Court’s analysis suggests the concepts of 
novelty and non-obviousness, or “inventiveness,” and patent-eligible 
subject matter are considered jointly. This joint consideration of these 
distinct patentability requirements is unsurprising for the time, as these 
concepts were not separated into individual statutory requirements 
until four years after Funk Brothers was decided.69 However, later 
decisions have continued to assume that these requirements are 
connected.70 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Funk Brothers caused a great deal 
of alarm in the patent community, particularly among those in the 
pharmaceutical industry. The patent community recognized that Funk 
Brothers required an inventive application as a condition of 
patentability, which departed from the historical standard of patent 
eligibility.71 The pharmaceutical industry was so concerned by Funk 
Brothers that it raised the issue in the hearings preceding the adoption 
of the 1952 Patent Act.72 A representative of the pharmaceutical 
industry urged Congress to clarify that newly discovered laws of nature 
remained patentable if they were embodied in new and useful 
applications.73 While never explicitly stated, it is believed that with the 
adoption of sections 100 and 101 of the 1952 Patent Act, Congress 
intended to overrule Funk Brothers.74 In section 100, Congress defined 
“invention” as an “invention or discovery.”75 Additionally, the term  
66. Id. at 131. 
67. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007). 
68. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131–32. 
69. Sanzo, Patent Eligibility, supra note 55, at 5. 
70. Id. 
71. Lefstin, supra note 54, at 631–32. 
72. Id. at 632. 
73. Id. (citing Patent Law Codification and Revision: Hearing on H.R. 3760 
Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 82nd Cong. 116–
18 (1951)) (statement of I. J. Fellner, Manager, Patent Department, Dr. 
Salsbury’s Laboratories). 
74. Id. at 633–34. 
75. 35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (2012). 
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“process” was defined as a “process, art or method, and includes a new 
use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, 
or material.”76 The definitions laid out in this section of the 1952 Patent 
Act suggest that Congress heeded the warning of the pharmaceutical 
industry and abolished the inventive application required by Funk 
Brothers.77 
While it appears that Congress intended to overrule Funk Brothers 
when adopting the 1952 Patent Act, the Supreme Court continued to 
apply a Funk Brothers type of analysis when determining patent 
eligibility. In Parker v. Flook,78 the Supreme Court persisted in its belief 
that patent eligibility and “inventiveness” are connected.79 The claims 
in Flook were directed to a method for updating alarm limits. The only 
novel feature of the method, according to the Court, was a 
mathematical formula. The Court then analyzed whether the 
application of this formula made the claims eligible for patent 
protection.80 The Court determined that the approach taken in Funk 
Brothers was the appropriate analysis for the Flook claims. The Court 
went on to find that the novelty of the mathematical formula is not a 
determining factor in patent eligibility, rather the process itself must 
be new and useful.81 The Court, therefore, analyzed the claims after 
excluding the mathematical formula and found them invalid because 
they contained no patentable invention.82 
Foreshadowing the response to the Mayo/Alice test, Flook argued 
that the Court’s analysis of patent-eligible subject matter improperly 
imported the concerns of sections 102 and 103 into its section 101 
analysis.83 The Court rejected this argument, finding that it was “based 
on two fundamental misconceptions.”84 First, the Court stated that a 
narrow reading of section 101 was untenable because it would make a 
determination of patent eligibility depend on “draftsman’s art.”85 Such 
an interpretation would not, according to the Court, serve the principles 
underlying the exclusion of patents on abstract ideas, laws of nature, 
and natural phenomena. The Court ignored the definition of invention 
 
76. § 100(b). 
77. Lefstin, supra note 54, at 634. 
78. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
79. Sanzo, Patent Eligibility, supra note 55, at 7. 
80. Flook, 437 U.S. at 585. 
81. Id. at 591. 
82. Id. at 594. 
83. Id. at 592–94. 
84. Id. at 592. 
85. Id. at 593. 
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and discovery outlined by Congress in section 100 of the 1952 Patent 
Act and reasoned, “[t]he rule that the discovery of a law of nature 
cannot be patented rests, not on the notion that natural phenomena 
are not processes, but rather on the more fundamental understanding 
that they are not the kind of ‘discoveries’ that the statute was intended 
to protect.”86 Second, the Court found that Flook’s argument was based 
on the flawed belief that the claim was rejected merely for the fact that 
one component consisted of unpatentable subject matter.87 Flook 
argued that the Court’s analysis was inconsistent with decisions by the 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (the precursor to the Federal 
Circuit) that required claims to be considered as a whole. The Court 
maintained that, despite considering the individual elements of the 
claim without accounting for the mathematical formula, the claims were 
analyzed as a whole.88 
The approach to patent-eligible subject matter established in Funk 
Brothers and Flook blurred the line between patent eligibility and 
inventiveness. These cases made clear that inventiveness, while closely 
related to the concepts of novelty and non-obviousness, differs from 
these requirements because all the elements of the claim are not 
considered when determining inventiveness.89 Elements present in the 
claim that are found to be excluded from section 101 are not taken into 
account when evaluating the inventiveness of the claim.90 
B. Chakrabarty Approach to Eligible Subject Matter 
Just two years after deciding Flook, the Court took a different 
approach to analyzing patent-eligible subject matter in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty.91 Chakrabarty invented a human-made, genetically 
engineered bacterium capable of breaking down crude oil. The ability 
to break down crude oil is not possessed by any naturally occurring 
bacteria, making Chakrabarty’s invention significantly valuable in 
treating oil spills.92 
Unlike its opinion in Flook, the Court in Chakrabarty began its 
analysis with a construction of 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Court determined, 
based on the text of the statute, as well as the legislative history, that 
“Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given 
wide scope” and “include anything under the sun that is made by 
 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 593–94. 
88. Id. at 594. 
89. Sanzo, Patent Eligibility, supra note 55, at 6. 
90. Id. 
91. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
92. Id. at 305. 
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man.”93 Despite interpreting section 101 to have a wide scope, the Court 
acknowledged that section 101 has limits and does not embrace every 
discovery. Consequently, “a new mineral discovered in the earth or a 
new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise, 
Einstein could not have patented his celebrated E = mc2; nor could 
Newton have patented the law of gravity.”94 
After its statutory interpretation, the Court proceeded to analyze 
the claims of the patent. Unlike in Funk Brothers and Flook, however, 
the Court analyzed the claims in their entirety and not the individual 
elements of the claims. Consequently, the Court found that the claims 
“plainly qualif[y] as patentable subject matter” because they were 
directed to a non-naturally occurring manufacture or composition of 
matter.95 In finding the claims patent eligible, the Court focused on the 
significant amount of human intervention in the claims, as well as the 
markedly different characteristics of the bacteria from any found in 
nature and the significant utility of the claimed bacteria.96 
Despite the differences in analysis between Chakrabarty and Funk 
Brothers/Flook, the Court fails to acknowledge these differences. 
Rather, the Court attempts to distinguish the cases based on factual 
differences.97 The Court reasoned that the claims in Funk Brothers were 
directed to bacteria that existed in nature, while the bacterium claimed 
in Chakrabarty was not found in nature.98 This analysis fails to 
recognize, however, that the bacteria in Funk Brothers were a 
component of the claimed invention, not the invention itself. The 
individual strains of bacteria in the Funk Brothers claim are, therefore, 
analogous to the genes used to create the bacterium in Chakrabarty. 
The distinction between Funk Brothers and Chakrabarty, therefore, lies 
in how the claims are analyzed and not the factual distinctions between 
the cases.99 
The Chakrabarty approach to patent-eligible subject matter was 
also embraced by the Court one year later in Diamond v. Diehr.100 The 
claims in Diehr were directed to a process for curing synthetic rubber. 
The Court found the process in Diehr directed to patent-eligible subject 
matter because, while the claims employed a mathematical equation, 
they were not directed solely to the equation. The claims did not  
93. Id. at 307–09. 
94. Id. at 309. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 310. 
97. Sanzo, Patent Eligibility, supra note 55, at 9–10. 
98. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310. 
99. Sanzo, Patent Eligibility, supra note 55, at 9–10. 
100. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
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preempt every use of the equation, rather the claims only foreclosed use 
of the equation in combination with the other steps of the process.101 
After finding the claims directed to patent-eligible subject matter, the 
Court explicitly stated the need to analyze claims as a whole when 
determining patent eligibility. Furthermore, the need to analyze claims 
as a whole is particularly relevant in a process claim “because a new 
combination of steps in a process may be patentable even though all 
the constituents of the combination are well known and in common use 
before the combination was made.”102 While this Chakrabarty whole-
claim approach to patent-eligibility analysis remains contradictory to 
the Funk Brothers/Flook approach, the Court again attempted to 
distinguish these cases based on factual differences.103 The Court fails 
to realize, however, that the claims in Flook may be found valid as 
directed to an improvement in a process under the Chakrabarty/Diehr 
approach. The difference in outcome between Diehr and Flook, thus, 
appears to be based on the analytical approach and not factual 
differences between the cases.104 
C. The Federal Circuit’s Interpretation of Conflicting Supreme Court 
Precedent 
For the next three decades the Supreme Court did not address 
eligible subject matter. During this time, the Federal Circuit searched 
for a workable test, consistent with the Supreme Court’s conflicting 
precedent, to determine if a claim was directed to patent-eligible subject 
matter.105 Ultimately, the Federal Circuit adopted the “machine-or-
transformation” test as the sole test for determining patent eligibility. 
The Federal Circuit believed this test was consistent with Supreme 
Court’s fluctuating precedent on patent-eligible subject matter.106 
Under the “machine-or-transformation” test, an invention is directed to 
patent-eligible subject matter if it is tied to a particular machine or it 
transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.107 
The Supreme Court, however, did not agree that the “machine-or-
transformation” test was the sole means for determining patent-eligible 
 
101. Id. at 187. 
102. Id. at 188. 
103. Id. at 185–87. 
104. Sanzo, Patent Eligibility, supra note 55, at 5. 
105. Gruner, supra note 28, at 583–92. 
106. Id. at 590. See generally Benjamin J. McEniery, The Federal Circuit in 
Bilski: The Machine-or-Transformation Test, 91 J. Pat. & Trademark 
Off. Soc’y 253 (2009) (discussing the Federal Circuits adoption of the 
machine-or-transformation test). 
107. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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subject matter. In Bilski v. Kappos,108 the Court explicitly rejected the 
test as the sole means of determining patent-eligible subject matter. 
The “machine-or-transformation” test was, according to the Court, 
merely a helpful clue in determining patent eligibility.109 Despite 
rejecting the test as the sole means of determining patent eligibility, 
the Court did not provide any additional guidance in how to analyze 
patent eligibility, and merely referred back to its prior patent-eligibility 
case law.110 After Bilski, however, the Court appeared to develop a 
renewed interest in patent eligibility and issued four opinions on the 
subject within four years.111 These decisions culminated with the 
Court’s adoption of the Mayo/Alice two-step approach to analyzing 
patent-eligible subject matter. 
IV. The Mayo/Alice Two-Step 
In 2012, the Court issued a highly anticipated opinion in Mayo 
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,112 a decision 
many in the patent community hoped would clarify how to analyze 
patent eligibility. Mayo concerned two patents directed towards the use 
of thiopurine drugs in the treatment of autoimmune disorders.113 The 
claims were directed to three steps: administering the drug, determining 
the amount of the drug in a patient’s blood sample, and a “wherein” 
step that correlates the drug level with a need to increase or decrease 
the amount of drug administered to the patient.114 
In analyzing the claims, the Court first found that the patents “set 
forth laws of nature—namely, relationships between concentrations of 
certain metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a dosage of 
thiopurine drug will prove ineffective or cause harm.”115 The Court then 
looked to see if the claims “do significantly more than simply describe 
the natural relations.”116 In analyzing this question, the Court found 
that the claims do not add significantly more to the law of nature: 
 
108. 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
109. Id. at 604. 
110. Gruner, supra note 28, at 592. 
111. See generally Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 
U.S. 66 (2012); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 
133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 
(2014). 
112. 566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
113. Id. at 73. 
114. Id. at 74–75. 
115. Id. at 77. 
116. Id. 
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“[T]he claims inform a relevant audience about certain laws of nature; 
any additional steps consist of well-understood, routine, conventional 
activity already engaged in by the scientific community . . . .”117 
Additionally, “simply appending conventional steps, specified at a high 
level of generality, to laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract 
ideas cannot make those laws, phenomena, and ideas patentable.”118 
What the Court failed to emphasize is that the steps in Mayo were 
“routine” and “conventional” because “scientists already understood 
that the levels in a patient’s blood of certain metabolites . . . were 
correlated with the likelihood that a particular dosage of a thiopurine 
drug could cause harm or prove ineffective.”119 
The Court’s analysis of patent eligibility is driven by a concern of 
preemption. Consequently, claims that are directed to a law of nature, 
abstract idea, or natural phenomenon which preempt all other potential 
uses are not patent eligible.120 The Court expresses concern that while 
granting patent rights for the discovery of new laws of nature may 
encourage their discovery, “there is a danger that the grant of patents 
that tie up their use will inhibit future innovation premised upon them” 
and “otherwise foreclose[] more future invention than the underlying 
discovery could reasonably justify.”121 
To support its preemption concern, the Court cites O’Reilly v. 
Morse.122 After inventing the telegraph, Morse attempted to claim the 
exclusive right to all devices using electricity to print characters at a 
distance.123 The Court, however, held this claim invalid because it was 
too broad and preempted uses of the technology that Morse had not 
invented.124 In Mayo, the Court uses this same logic to hold that the 
claims at issue preempt all uses of the law of nature and are invalid.125 
While the concern of preemption is valid, the reliance on Morse to 
support holding claims invalid under section 101 is misplaced. While 
Morse is concerned with preemption, the Morse Court anchors this 
concern in the requirements of written description and enablement, not 
in patent eligibility.126 
 
117. Id. at 79–80. 
118. Id. at 82. 
119. Id. at 73–74. 
120. Id. at 85–87. 
121. Id. at 86. 
122. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853). 
123. Id. at 112. 
124. Id. at 112–13. 
125. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 86–87. 
126. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 113 (“[H]e claims an exclusive right to use a 
manner and process which he has not described and indeed had not 
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Despite outrage from the patent community following the decision 
in Mayo,127 the Court doubled down on its two-step approach to eligible 
subject matter in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International.128 The Court 
affirmed that the two-step approach established in Mayo was the 
appropriate test for all claims directed toward laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas: 
First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to 
one of those patent-ineligible concepts. If so, we then ask, “[w]hat 
else is there in the claims before us?” . . . We have described step 
two of this analysis as a search for an “‘inventive concept’”—i.e., 
an element or combination of elements that is “sufficient to ensure 
that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a 
patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”129 
The Court continued to anchor the concern behind the exclusionary 
principle that inventions must be directed to patent-eligible subject 
matter as one of preemption. The Court noted that “[l]aws of nature, 
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are the basic tools of scientific 
and technological work. [M]onopolization of those tools through the 
grant of a patent might tend to impede innovation more than it would 
tend to promote it, thereby thwarting the primary object of the patent 
laws.”130 Notably, the Court cautioned: 
[W]e tread carefully in construing this exclusionary principle lest 
it swallow all of patent law. At some level, “all inventions . . . 
embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, or abstract ideas.” Thus, an invention is not rendered 
ineligible for patent simply because it involves an abstract 
concept.131 
 
invented, and therefore could not describe when he obtained his patent.”); 
see, e.g., Jacob Adam Schroeder, Written Description: Protecting the 
Quid Pro Quo Since 1793, 21 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. 
L.J. 63, 73–75 (2010) (discussing the historical development of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112). 
127. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Killing Industry: The Supreme Court Blows Mayo 
v. Prometheus, IPWatchdog (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.ipwatchdog. 
com/2012/03/20/supreme-court-mayo-v-prometheus/id=22920/ [https:// 
perma.cc/UR3X-S5Q5] (discussing how the Court’s decision in Mayo 
failed to take basic patent law principles into account and explaining why 
the case was wrongly decided). 
128. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
129. Id. at 2355 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
130. Id. at 2354 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
131. Id. at 2354 (citations omitted). 
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However, application of the Mayo/Alice two-step has proceeded to 
swallow biotechnology patents whole.132 
V. Two-Stepping Through the Patent-Eligibility 
Wasteland 
Since the development of the Mayo/Alice two-step, patents are 
being rejected and invalidated at an alarming rate. The deleterious 
effects of the Mayo/Alice framework are being felt from the USPTO133 
to the Federal Circuit.134 
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.135 is frequently cited as 
a clear illustration of the negative effect of the Mayo/Alice test on 
biotechnology patents.136 The Federal Circuit held Sequenom’s 
invention137 invalid for not satisfying section 101 as analyzed under the 
Mayo/Alice framework, despite finding the invention “a significant 
contribution to the medical field.”138 The Federal Circuit found 
Sequenom’s patent directed to a natural phenomenon—the presence of 
cffDNA in maternal plasma.139 Consequently, the court proceeded to 
analyze the claims for an inventive step sufficient to transform the 
 
132. See infra Parts VI–VIII. 
133. See, e.g., James Cosgrove, § 101 Rejections in the Post-Alice Era, 
IPWatchdog (Mar. 7, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/03/07/ 
101-rejections-post-alice-era/id=78635/ [https://perma.cc/NV9A-FHDP] 
(analyzing the increase in section 101 rejections issued by the USPTO 
post-Alice and the success rate of overcoming section 101 rejections). 
134. See, e.g., Paul R. Gugliuzza & Mark A. Lemley, Can a Court Change the 
Law by Saying Nothing?, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 765, 767 (2018) (stating that 
in post-Alice patent-eligible subject matter cases, the Federal Circuit has 
found only 7.7 percent of challenged patents valid). 
135. 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
136. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Supreme Court Denies Cert. in Sequenom v. Ariosa 
Diagnostics, IPWatchdog (June 27, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/ 
2016/06/27/70409/id=70409/ [https://perma.cc/5YBF-9KPX] (discussing 
how the Supreme Court denied certiorari despite the harm to the life 
sciences that the Federal Circuit’s decision caused); Michael J. Flibbert 
& Emily R. Gabranski, Ariosa Diagnostics v. Sequenom Among the Most 
Important Federal Circuit Decisions from 2015, Finnegan: Fed. Cir. IP 
Blog (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/blogs/ 
federal-circuit-ip/ariosa-diagnostics-v-sequenom-among-the-most-important-
federal-circuit-decisions-from-2015.html#page=1 [https://perma.cc/W934-
CSYJ] (discussing the importance of the Ariosa decision and how it could 
result in natural product and diagnostic method patents becoming more 
difficult to obtain and enforce). 
137. See supra notes 1–13 and accompanying text. 
138. Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1379–80. 
139. Id. at 1376. 
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naturally occurring phenomenon into a patentable invention. The 
Federal Circuit held that the steps of DNA amplification and detection 
were “well-understood, routine, and conventional activity” at the time 
the method was developed.140 Consequently, the method “amounts to a 
general instruction to doctors to apply routine, conventional techniques 
when seeking to detect cffDNA.”141 Additionally, the Federal Circuit 
held “the only subject matter new and useful as of the date of the 
application was the discovery of the presence of cffDNA in maternal 
plasma or serum.”142 Furthermore, despite the Supreme Court’s 
emphasis on preemption driving the need for the Mayo/Alice test, the 
Federal Circuit found Sequenom’s argument that the claims of the 
patent have a narrow preemptive scope unpersuasive.143 
Judge Linn wrote a concurring opinion in which he agreed with the 
majority’s analysis under the Mayo/Alice test but expressed strong 
disapproval of the test and its result.144 Linn criticized the Mayo/Alice 
two-step as overly broad and resulting in the invalidation of otherwise 
valid, meritorious patents.145 Linn aptly noted that the claims at issue 
in Sequenom’s patent were unlike those in Mayo, because “no one was 
amplifying and detecting paternally inherited cffDNA using the plasma 
or serum of pregnant mothers.”146 Consequently, Linn felt that 
Sequenom’s patent was “truly meritorious” and “deserving of patent 
protection.”147 
Sequenom appealed the Federal Circuit’s decision to the Supreme 
Court. Bolstered by Judge Linn’s critical concurring opinion, many in 
the patent community were hopeful the Supreme Court would grant 
certiorari.148 In a decision that shocked many in the biotechnology and 
patent community, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.149 
 
140. Id. at 1377. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 1378–79. 
144. Id. at 1380 (Linn, J., concurring). 
145. Id. at 1380–81. 
146. Id. at 1381. 
147. Id. 
148. See David Tellekson & Jessica Kaempf, Litigation Alert: Federal Circuit’s 
Ariosa Decision, Good Chance for Rehearing En Banc, Fenwick & West 
LLP (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.fenwick.com/publications/pages/ 
federal-circuits-ariosa-decision.aspx [https://perma.cc/N8ZP-3A6M] (stating 
that Judge Linn’s concurrence may be an invitation for further clarity from 
the Supreme Court regarding patent eligibility). 
149. Id. 
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Ariosa is merely one example of truly meritorious, life-saving 
patents that have been refused patent protection by the USPTO or 
invalidated by the courts under the Mayo/Alice two-step.150 These 
inventions are often directed to innovations that vastly improve 
diagnostics and treatments. The Patent and Trial Appeal Board 
(PTAB) has relied on the Mayo/Alice two-step to reject a method for 
diagnosing Alzheimer’s disease.151 The method, based on measuring the 
amount of a metabolite in the cerebrospinal fluid of a subject, shows 
enhanced specificity and sensitivity over prior Alzheimer’s diagnostic 
methods.152 The PTAB found the relationship between the metabolite 
level and Alzheimer’s disease to be a law of nature. In its search for an 
inventive concept, the PTAB dissected and analyzed each element of 
the claims and found that the additional claimed steps were routine or 
conventional and did not amount to significantly more than the law of 
nature itself.153 
The groundbreaking cancer diagnostic method, BRCA testing, has 
also been held invalid as being directed to patent-ineligible subject 
matter. Certain mutations in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes are linked 
to the development of breast and ovarian cancer. By testing for 
mutations in the BRCA genes, doctors can often determine an 
individual’s risk for developing breast or ovarian cancer.154 
Consequently, BRCA testing has become a critical tool in determining 
an individual’s cancer risk.155 In In re BRCA1- and BRCA2-Based 
Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litigation,156 however, the Federal 
Circuit invalidated this meritorious diagnostic method. 
The Federal Circuit analyzed the claims using the Mayo/Alice two-
step. Under the first step of the test, the court held that the method 
claims recited an abstract mental process of comparing and analyzing 
 
150. See, e.g., Chao, supra note 15 (discussing how in the wake of the Supreme 
Court’s recent decisions regarding patent-eligible subject matter many 
patents that rely upon a law of nature have been declared patent-
ineligible). 
151. Ex parte Myint, No. 2013-009161, 2015 WL 5272660 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 26, 2015). 
152. U.S. Patent Pub. No. 2011/0065202, at [0003] (filed Mar. 17, 2011). 
153. Myint, No. 2013-009161, slip op. at 7–8. 
154. In re BRCA1- & BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litig., 
774 F.3d 755, 758 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
155. See BRCA1 and BRCA2: Cancer Risk and Genetic Testing, NIH: 
National Cancer Inst., https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/causes-
prevention/genetics/brca-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/F48H-99LV] (last 
updated Jan. 30, 2018) (explaining the association of the BRCA genes 
with cancer risk, the process of BRCA testing, and who should get tested). 
156. 774 F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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different gene sequences.157 Proceeding to step two, the court dissected 
the claims into individual elements and held that the patent-eligible 
elements of the claims were not sufficient to make the claims, as a 
whole, patent-eligible; the techniques used to amplify and analyze the 
BRCA sequences were routine and ordinary.158 Consequently, the 
Federal Circuit held that the method claims were invalid as being 
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.159 
The invalidation of the BRCA patents was a particularly stinging 
blow as it came after the Supreme Court suggested such method claims 
would be patent-eligible. In Association for Molecular Pathology v. 
Myriad Genetics, Inc.,160 the Court analyzed the eligibility of claims 
directed to the BRCA gene sequences. The Court held that the 
naturally occurring DNA sequence of the gene is a product of nature 
and not patent-eligible.161 In its decisions, however, the Court noted 
that the case did not “involve patents on new applications of knowledge 
about the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes” and “[a]s the first party with 
knowledge of the [BRCA1 and BRCA2] sequences, Myriad was in an 
excellent position to claim applications of that knowledge. Many of its 
unchallenged claims are limited to such applications.”162 This statement 
by the Supreme Court was dismissed by the Federal Circuit during its 
analysis of the BRCA method claims. The Federal Circuit reasoned 
that no method claims were actually before the Supreme Court in the 
Myriad case. Furthermore, the Federal Circuit noted that the method 
claims contemplated to be patent-eligible in Myriad were narrower in 
scope than the claims currently before them.163 This reasoning further 
underscores the driving concern of preemption in the Mayo/Alice 
analysis of patent eligibility. 
In another recent blow to biotechnology and diagnostic patents, the 
Federal Circuit upheld a district court decision invalidating three 
Cleveland Clinic Foundation patents as being directed to patent-
ineligible subject matter.164 The patents claim methods of assessing a 
patient’s risk of cardiovascular disease based on detection of 
 
157. Id. at 763–64. 
158. Id. at 764–65. 
159. Id. at 765. 
160. 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
161. Id. at 2111. 
162. Id. at 2120 (alteration in original) (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology 
v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
163. In re BRCA, 774 F.3d at 765. 
164. Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 859 F.3d 1352 
(Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2621 (2018). 
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myeloperoxidase (MPO), an early symptom of cardiovascular disease, 
in the patient’s blood sample.165 This new diagnostic method is a 
groundbreaking innovation and a substantial breakthrough in the early 
detection of cardiovascular disease.166 
The Federal Circuit applied the Mayo/Alice two-step analysis and 
determined the claims were directed to a law of nature—the presence 
of MPO correlates with cardiovascular disease.167 Under step two, the 
Federal Circuit dissected the claims into individual elements and 
determined there was no inventive concept present because the claims 
used known techniques that were routine and conventional. These 
routine techniques, consequently, did not suffice to transform the 
claimed invention into a patentable method.168 
Despite the repeated focus on preemption driving the exclusionary 
principle of section 101, the Federal Circuit found no significance in the 
fact that the claims of Cleveland Clinic’s diagnostic methods, analyzed 
as a whole, had a narrow preemptive scope.169 The Federal Circuit 
focused instead on the individual elements of the claims and reasoned 
that, “[w]here a patent’s claims are deemed only to disclose patent 
ineligible subject matter under the Mayo framework, as they are in this 
case, preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot.”170 
VI. Determining Patent Eligibility on a Motion to 
Dismiss 
Since the adoption of the Mayo/Alice two-step, patent eligibility 
has increasingly been decided on Rule 12(b)(6) motions.171 The Federal 
Circuit has repeatedly recognized that determination of patent 
eligibility under section 101 on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is proper.172  
165. Id. at 1355. 
166. Corrected Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 56, Cleveland Clinic Found. v. 
True Health Diagnostics LLC, 859 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (No. 16-
1766). 
167. Cleveland Clinic Found., 859 F.3d at 1360. 
168. Id. at 1362. 
169. Id. at 1363. 
170. Id. (quoting Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). 
171. See, e.g., Edward Tulin & Leslie Demers, A Look at Post-Alice Rule 12 
Motions over the Last 2 Years, Law360 (Jan. 27, 2017); Michael Wilburn 
et al., Pretrial Dismissals and Judgments in Post-Alice Courts, Law360 
(Apr. 23, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/642593/pretrial-dismissals-
and-judgments-in-post-alice-courts [https://perma.cc/Z25A-NTCH]. 
172. See Genetic Tech. Ltd. v. Merial LLC, 818 F.3d 1369, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 
2016) (citing OIP Tech., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362 
(Fed. Cir. 2015)); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells 
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Based on Supreme Court precedent,173 the Federal Circuit has treated 
patent eligibility as a threshold legal question based on the claims and 
not a predominantly factual inquiry.174 The Federal Circuit has also 
stated, however, that subject-matter eligibility can be determined prior 
to any formal claim construction, noting that “claim construction is not 
an inviolable prerequisite to a validity determination under [section] 
101.”175 
Determining patent eligibility on a motion to dismiss is believed to 
save the court and the parties time and money, increase judicial 
efficiency, and quickly dispose of weak patents which do not meet the 
statutory requirements for patentability.176 The Federal Circuit has 
recently found, however, that determining patent eligibility before fact 
finding and claim construction may be problematic.177 In Berkheimer v. 
HP Inc.,178 the Federal Circuit found that while patent-eligible subject 
matter is a question of law, the question of whether a claim or claim 
element is well-understood, routine, or conventional is a factual 
determination.179 Furthermore, a factual issue may arise where the 
specification demonstrates that the claims do not describe well-
understood, routine, and conventional activities.180 A finding of a factual 
dispute based on information provided in the specification goes against 
Federal Circuit precedent that patent eligibility can be determined by 
looking solely at the claims.181 This finding is consistent, however, with 
 
Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014); buySAFE, 
Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
173. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2015); Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 
134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus 
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72–73 (2012). 
174. Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 8–9, Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 
881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 12, 2018) (No. 17-1437). 
175. Merial, 818 F.3d at 1374 (quoting Bancorp Servs., LLC v. Sun Life 
Assurance Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). 
176. The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Commentary 
on Patent Litigation Best Practices: Section 101 Motions on 
Patentable Subject Matter Chapter 2 (2016); Appellee’s Petition 
for Rehearing En Banc at 15–16, Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 12, 2018) (No. 17-1437). 
177. Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Aatrix 
Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, 882 F.3d 1121, 1125–28 (Fed. 
Cir. 2018). 
178. 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
179. Id. at 1368–69. 
180. Id. at 1369. 
181. See supra notes 171–175 and accompanying text. 
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the well-established standard that claims are interpreted in light of the 
specification.182 
Less than a week after issuing the Berkheimer decision, the Federal 
Circuit issued another opinion involving underlying issues of fact in 
patent eligibility in Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, 
Inc.183 The Federal Circuit reaffirmed that patent eligibility is a 
question of law with significant, subsidiary factual questions which 
must be resolved prior to making a legal determination.184 In Aatrix, 
the Federal Circuit embraced the consideration of extrinsic evidence 
when determining patent eligibility. After acknowledging that whether 
a claim is well-understood or conventional, the Federal Circuit stated 
that, in the current case, this “question cannot be answered adversely 
to the patentee based on the sources properly considered on a motion 
to dismiss, such as the complaint, the patent, and materials subject to 
judicial notice.”185 
The recent acknowledgment by the Federal Circuit that patent 
eligibility is in part a fundamentally factual inquiry and that the 
Mayo/Alice two-step is based upon questions of fact appears at odds 
with other Federal Circuit decisions.186 This conflicting approach was 
noted, in dissent, by Judge Reyna in Aatrix.187 Judge Reyna stated that 
the Federal Circuit’s precedent makes clear that the section 101 inquiry 
is one of law.188 Furthermore, shifting the section 101 analysis from a 
legal to a factual inquiry “opens the door in both steps of the Alice 
inquiry for the introduction of an inexhaustible array of extrinsic 
evidence, such as prior art, publications, other patents, and expert 
opinion.”189 The discrepancy has resulted in heightened confusion in the 
already murky waters of patent-eligibility analysis as lower courts 
attempt to discern when patent-eligibility can be decided prior to fact 
finding.190 
 
182. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
183. 882 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
184. Id. at 1128. 
185. Id. 
186. See, e.g., OIP Tech., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 
2015) (reviewing a section 101 appeal as only an issue of law); Intellectual 
Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
(same). 
187. Aatrix, 882 F.3d at 1130 (Reyna, J., dissenting). 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
190. See, e.g., Vaporstream, Inc. v. Snap Inc., No. 2-17-CV-00220-MLH (KSx), 
2018 WL 1116530, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2018); Sycamore IP Holdings 
LLC v. AT&T Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 620, 650 (E.D. Tex. 2018). 
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VII. Drafting Around the Two-Step 
The Federal Circuit recently provided a glimmer of hope for the 
patent eligibility of diagnostic methods and personalized methods. In 
Vanda Pharmaceuticals v. West-Ward Pharmaceuticals 
International,191 the Federal Circuit addressed the patent eligibility of 
claims that are very similar to the claims in Mayo. Vanda 
Pharmaceuticals is the owner of an exclusive license on a U.S. patent 
directed to a method of treating schizophrenics with the drug 
iloperidone, wherein the dosage is determined based on the patient’s 
genotype.192 The cytochrome P450 2D6 gene (CYP2D6) encodes an 
enzyme which metabolizes numerous drugs, including iloperidone. 
Certain mutations in the CYP2D6 gene can result in lower CYP2D6 
activity. A patient with lower CYP2D6 activity will be a poor 
metabolizer of drugs.193 Based on this discovery, the patent at issue 
claims a method of treating poor metabolizers, identified through a 
genetic test, with lower doses of iloperidone.194 
While the claims in Vanda are similar to the patent-ineligible claims 
in Mayo, the Federal Circuit held the Vanda claims patent eligible.195 
Both the Vanda and Mayo claims correlate a patient’s ability to 
metabolize a drug with the proper dosage for the individual.196 Despite 
the similarities in the claims, the Federal Circuit found that, unlike 
Mayo, the Vanda claims did not set forth merely a natural law. Rather, 
the Vanda claims are directed to a method of treating schizophrenia 
based on genotyping. The Federal Circuit noted, “[t]he inventors 
recognized the relationship between iloperidone [and] CYP2D6 
metabolism [], but that is not what they claimed. They claimed an 
application of the relationship. Unlike the claim at issue in Mayo, the 
claims here require a treating doctor to administer iloperidone.”197 
While the claim in Mayo recited administering the drug to a patient, in 
Vanda “the claim as a whole was not directed to the administration of 
a drug to treat a particular disease.”198 The administering step in Mayo  
191. 887 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
192. Id. at 1121. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. at 1136. 
196. See Stephanie Sivinski, Vanda v. West-Ward: This Time, Dosage 
Adjustment Claims Are Patent Eligible Subject Matter, IPWatchdog 
(May 16, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/05/16/vanda-v-west-
ward-dosage-adjustment-claims-patent-eligible/id=97117/ [https://perma.cc/ 
436S-KHTF] (comparing the claims in Mayo and Vanda). 
197. Vanda, 887 F.3d at 1135. 
198. Id. at 1134. 
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was merely a limitation telling doctors to apply a known natural 
relationship and “the patent claims do not confine their reach to 
particular applications of those laws.”199 
Additionally, the Vanda claims do not preempt every use of the 
natural relationship between CYP2D6 and iloperidone metabolism. 
They “do not ‘tie up the doctor’s subsequent treatment decision.’”200 
The Mayo claims, however, merely recognized a need to alter a dose 
based on drug metabolism. Thus, the Mayo claims did not actually 
involve doctors using the natural relationship between drug metabolism 
and dosage. The Vanda claims explicitly recite the limitation of 
carrying out a dosage regimen based on genotype testing.201 The claims 
require a doctor to administer a certain amount of iloperidone if a 
patient is a poor metabolizer and a different amount if the patient is 
not a poor metabolizer. This limitation contrasts with the limitation in 
Mayo, which merely stated that thiopurine metabolism indicates a need 
to adjust the administered dosage.202 
In dissent, Chief Judge Prost argued that the majority in Vanda 
did not heed the Supreme Court’s warning that patent eligibility should 
not depend on drafting efforts.203 Chief Judge Prost found that the 
addition of a treatment step with specific dosages of iloperidone was 
not sufficient to make the claims patent eligible and did not distinguish 
the claims from those in Mayo.204 Additionally, according to the Chief 
Judge Prost, while some methods of treatment may be patent eligible, 
the Federal Circuit “remain[s] beholden to the holding of Mayo, which 
[] requires [the Federal Circuit] to find the claims directed to a natural 
law at step one.”205 Furthermore, “the end result of the claimed process 
is no more than the conclusion of a natural law” and “[t]he recitation 
of the specific dosages adds no more than a conventional application of 
that natural law.”206 West-Ward filed a petition for writ of certiorari 
echoing Chief Judge Prost’s dissent and asking the Supreme Court to 
address whether “patents that claim a method of medically treating a 
 
199. Id. at 1135 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 
566 U.S. 66, 87 (2012)). 
200. Id. at 1135 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 86). 
201. Id. 
202. Id. 
203. Vanda, 887 F.3d at 1142 (Prost, C.J., dissenting). 
204. Id. at 1142–43. 
205. Id. at 1143. 
206. Id. 
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patient automatically satisfy section 101 of the Patent Act, even if they 
apply a natural law using only routine and conventional steps.”207 
If the Federal Circuit decision stands, Vanda sets a precedent that 
diagnostics may be patent eligible if they include a method of treatment 
step. In the wake of the Vanda decision, the USPTO issued a 
memorandum addressing the decision and its impact on the patent 
eligibility of method of treatment claims.208 The memorandum states 
that claims that include a method of treatment step should be 
considered patent eligible and are not directed to patent-ineligible 
subject matter.209 The Vanda decision, as well as the USPTO memo, 
imply that diagnostic claims, such as those in Ariosa210 and Cleveland 
Clinic211 would have been patent eligible if the claims included a method 
of treatment step after diagnosis. 
The Vanda decision has provided hope for the patent eligibility of 
diagnostic method claims, especially as the Federal Circuit has relied 
on Vanda to uphold the validity of claims including a method of 
treatment.212 However, it is too soon to determine the impact the case 
will have on the future of patent eligibility. The addition of a method 
of treatment step to make, an otherwise ineligible, claim patent-eligible, 
if reviewed by the Supreme Court, may be viewed as mere “draftsman’s 
art.” In Mayo, the Court cautioned that patent statutes should not be 
interpreted “in ways that make patent eligibility ‘depend simply on 
draftsman’s art’ without reference to the ‘principles underlying the 
prohibition against patents for [natural laws].’”213 
 
207. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hikma Pharms. v. Vanda Pharms., 877 
F.3d 1117 (2018) (No. 18-817). 
208. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Memorandum on Recent Subject Matter 
Eligibility Decision: Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. West-Ward 
Pharmaceuticals (June 7, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/memo-vanda-20180607.PDF [https://perma.cc/2SZQ-ESBH]. 
209. Id. at 2–3. 
210. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  
211. Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics, 859 F.3d 1352 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017). 
212. Endo Pharm. Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 919 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 
2019); Natural Alternatives Int’l, Inc. v. Creative Compounds, LLC, 918 
F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2019).  
213. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72 
(2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 
(1978)). 
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VIII. Consequences of not Replacing the Mayo/Alice 
Two-Step 
The Mayo/Alice two-step has bred uncertainty and fear in 
American inventors and investors. The uncertainty permeating the U.S. 
patent system has resulted in the United States continuing its fall in 
the ranks of global patent protection.214 The United States is no longer 
the “gold standard” for patent protection and will likely continue its 
decline if some degree of certainty is not injected into what inventions 
are patent eligible. 
Under the Mayo/Alice two-step, the oncomouse patent, a driving 
force behind the biotechnology boom in the United States,215 would be 
invalid for being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under 
section 101. Under the first step of the Mayo/Alice test, the claims are 
directed to a law of nature—the expression of oncogenes promotes the 
development of malignant tumors.216 Proceeding to step two, the 
remaining elements of the claim recite routine, conventional activity—
introducing an oncogene into germ cells and somatic cells in a non-
human mammal.217 Researchers had been introducing non-native DNA 
into cells through various methods for years prior to the development 
of the oncomouse.218 Consequently, the additional elements of the 
oncomouse claims do not add sufficiently more to transform the patent-
ineligible law of nature into a patent-eligible invention. 
Even Chakrabarty’s oil-destroying bacterium, which paved the way 
for the patenting of the oncomouse, would be ineligible under today’s 
Mayo/Alice two-step.219 This ineligibility would, furthermore, affect the 
majority of patents that paved the way for the biotechnology industry 
in the United States.220 Under today’s patent-eligibility standards, 
revolutionary breakthroughs that sit at the leading edge of innovation 
are being denied patent protection in the United States. Many of these 
 
214. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, U.S. Patent System Falls to 12th Place in Chamber 
Global IP Index for 2018, IPWatchdog (Feb. 8, 2018), http://www. 
ipwatchdog.com/2018/02/08/u-s-patent-system-falls-12th-place-chamber-
global-ip-index-2018/id=93494/ [https://perma.cc/9BLM-LTGY] (stating 
that the United States fell in the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s annual 
Global IP Index for the second year in a row). 
215. See supra Part I. 
216. U.S. Pat. No. 4,736,866 col. 1 ll. 37–42 (filed June 22, 1984). 
217. Id. at col. 1 ll. 33–34. 
218. Id. at col. 1 ll. 4–28. 
219. See Brief of Dr. Ananda Chakrabarty as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 11, Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 
1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (No. 15-1182). 
220. Id. 
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innovations, however, are being protected in places such as Europe and 
China.221 No longer the “gold standard” in patent protection, the United 
States has found itself in the same position as Europe when the Europe 
Patent Office hesitated to patent the oncomouse. As inventors and 
investors worry about protecting their intellectual property and 
recouping their investment, they are sending investments and 
innovations overseas to nations with stronger patent protection.222 The 
uncertainty in patent eligibility is hampering the progress of diagnostic, 
medical, and life science developments in the United States at a time 
when the whole world is vying to lead the way in innovation.223 
The overreach of the Mayo/Alice framework continues to cause 
upheaval and uncertainty for those seeking patent protection in the life 
sciences. The Supreme Court’s refusal to grant certiorari in a number 
of patent-eligibility cases suggests that the uncertainty, rejections, and 
invalidations will continue to plague life science patents. Without an 
intervention and change to the current Mayo/Alice two-step approach, 
the U.S. patent system will continue to weaken and we will hamper the 
progress of life-saving medical innovation. 
IX. Correcting the Mayo/Alice Two-Step Through 
Statutory Amendment 
Despite the need for a new patent-eligibility test, the Supreme 
Court appears hesitant to revisit the Mayo/Alice approach to eligible 
subject matter. Consequently, some in the patent community have 
begun advocating for Congress to overturn the Mayo/Alice two-step 
through statutory amendment.224 It is unlikely, however, that amending 
 
221. Gene Quinn, Have We Gone Too Far to Eradicate Weak Patents?, 
IPWatchdog (Mar. 8, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/03/08/ 
gone-too-far-eradicate-weak-patents/id=79248/ [https://perma.cc/6LVR-
DTFE].  
222. See, e.g., id.; Rana Foroohar, A Better US Patent System Will Spur 
Innovation, Fin. Times (Sept. 3, 2017), https://amp.ft.com/content/ 
74114a6c-8f28-11e7-9084-d0c17942ba93 [https://perma.cc/6CBD-5DTP]. 
223. Steve Brachmann, Patent-Ineligibility of Medical Diagnostics, Life 




224. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 51 (discussing the unworkability of the 
Mayo/Alice approach to eligible subject matter and proposing the time 
has come to amend the patent statute); David O. Taylor, Amending 
Patent Eligibility, 50 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 2149 (2017) (discussing why 
the Supreme Court is unlikely to grant certiorari on a case involving 
patent eligibility and proposing legislative amendments to the patent 
statute); Gene Quinn, IPO Adopts Resolution Supporting Legislation to 
Amend 35 U.S.C. § 101, IPWatchdog (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www. 
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the patent statute will adequately solve the problems surrounding the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of eligible subject matter. 
The Supreme Court’s repeated denial of certiorari in patent-
eligibility cases has caused many in the patent community to lose hope 
that the Court will address patent eligibility in the foreseeable future.225 
Hope that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari to address section 
101 should not be abandoned quite yet, however. With the recent split 
in the Federal Circuit regarding the underlying factual issues in patent 
eligibility, the use of draftsman’s art to make diagnostic method claims 
patent eligible, and the continued uncertainty surrounding patent 
eligibility, the time seems ripe for the Court to readdress patent-eligible 
subject matter. With multiple petitions for certiorari addressing patent 
eligibility currently pending before the Court, there is hope that the 
Court may find that the time has come to resolve the uncertainty 
surrounding patent eligibility.226 Furthermore, the Federal Circuit’s 
split decision in Vanda seems likely to catch the Court’s attention in 
light of their previous warning regarding draftsman’s art in Mayo. A 
prominent patent law commentator has even called the Vanda decision 
“a high flaunting of Supreme Court precedent.”227 
An analysis of all of the Supreme Court’s patent law cases since 
2005 further supports the Supreme Court addressing patent eligibility 
in 2018; when there is patent-related legislation pending, the Supreme 
Court takes at least one provision from the pending legislation and 
implements it as law.228 There are currently multiple patent-related bills  
ipwatchdog.com/2017/01/31/ipo-adopts-resolution-legislation-amend-101/ 
id=77818/ [https://perma.cc/9TBA-CZST]; Robert Stoll, Patent Bar 
Groups Propose Legislation to Fix Patent Subject Matter Eligibility 
Problems, IPWatchdog (July 25, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/ 
2017/07/25/patent-bar-groups-propose-legislation-fix-patent-subject-matter-
eligibility-problems/id=86015/ [https://perma.cc/H8LL-4TWR]. 
225. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 136; Dennis Crouch, Denied Certiorari on 
Section 101, PatentlyO (Oct. 2, 2017), https://patentlyo.com/patent/ 
2017/10/denied-certiorari-section.html [https://perma.cc/97M7-DBLB]; 
Jeffrey A. Lefstin et al., The Need for Legislative Reform: The Berkeley 
Section 101 Workshop, PatentlyO (Oct. 10, 2017), https://patentlyo. 
com/patent/2017/10/legislative-berkeley-workshop.html [https://perma.cc/ 
PP4B-2EW3]. 
226. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hikma Pharms. v. Vanda 
Pharms., 877 F.3d 1117 (No. 18-817); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (No. 18-415). 
227. Dennis Crouch, Vanda on Rehearing: Will the Federal Circuit Defy 
SCOTUS?, PatentlyO (June 27, 2018), https://patentlyo.com/patent/ 
2018/06/rehearing-federal-circuit.html [https://perma.cc/NJM2-CFWC]. 
228. Paul Morinville & Gene Quinn, Will the Supreme Court Continue to Be 
Influenced by Patent Reform?, IPWatchdog (Jan. 2, 2018), http:// 
www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/01/02/supreme-court-influenced-patent-reform/ 
id=91501/ [https://perma.cc/7W7T-WGG5]. 
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pending in Congress, all of which tackle patent-eligibility reform, 
suggesting the Supreme Court may address patent eligibility in the near 
future.229 
If the Supreme Court does grants certiorari in a patent-eligibility 
case, those advocating for a legislative amendment to the patent statute 
believe that stare decisis will prevent the Supreme Court from altering 
the Mayo/Alice framework.230 In Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, 
LLC,231 the Court addressed the role of stare decisis in the context of 
patent law. While Kimble addressed the issue of licensing fees for 
expired patents, and not statutory requirements for patentability, the 
Court emphasized stare decisis in deciding not to overrule established 
precedent in cases involving property law.232 The refusal to overturn 
precedent went against overwhelming evidence that the precedent was 
wrongly decided.233 The Court quoted Justice Brandeis that “it is 
usually ‘more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than 
that it be settled right.’”234 To overturn precedent, the Court stated, 
there must be “‘special justification’—over and above the belief ‘that 
the precedent was wrongly decided.’”235 The Court repeatedly 
emphasized that it is the role of Congress and not the Court to “correct 
any mistake it sees” in the Court’s interpretation of a patent statute.236 
Additionally, the Court noted that “the choice of what patent policy 
should be lies first and foremost with Congress.”237 
The Kimble decision, however, does not destroy all hope of the 
Supreme Court changing its patent-eligibility precedent. The Court 
noted that the established precedent had not proved “unworkable,”238 
which is a “traditional justification” for overruling precedent.239 Since 
the Court’s adoption of the Mayo/Alice two-step, the precedent has 
 
229. Id. 
230. See Taylor, supra note 224, at 2157–62 (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of stare decisis in patent law cases and why it is unlikely to 
change the Mayo/Alice framework). 
231. 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015). 
232. Id. at 2405; see also Taylor, supra note 224, at 2159–60. 
233. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2412; Taylor, supra note 224, at 2159. 
234. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2409 (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 
285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
235. Id. (quoting Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 
2407 (2014)). 
236. Id. 
237. Id. at 2414. 
238. Id. at 2411. 
239. Id. (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989)). 
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proved entirely unworkable.240 The Mayo/Alice test lacks 
administrability and has caused substantial confusion in patent 
eligibility. The test fails to provide objective guidelines and leaves the 
patent-eligibility determination to the subjective opinion of a judge or 
patent examiner.241 The confusion caused by the Mayo/Alice test has 
even led one law professor to refer to the test as “gobbledygook,” a term 
borrowed from Justice Scalia in connection with another patentability 
test.242 The unworkability of the current patent-eligibility test may 
provide the Supreme Court the “special justification” needed to 
overturn its wrongly decided precedent. 
Furthermore, Kimble was not a unanimous decision; three justices 
dissented from the Court’s decision to uphold its established 
precedent.243 Justice Alito criticized the majority’s decision to employ 
stare decisis to “reaffirm a clear case of judicial overreach.”244 He 
cautioned that “stare decisis is not an ‘inexorable command.’”245 In an 
argument equally applicable to the Mayo/Alice precedent, Alito noted 
that the established precedent in Kimble created economic barriers that 
stifle innovation.246 Also, the Kimble precedent was based on policy-
making more than actual interpretation of the Patent Act, so the Court 
should be more open to reconsidering the precedent.247 This argument 
is equally applicable to the patent-eligibility precedent—while the 
Mayo/Alice test appears to be an interpretation of section 101, the 
driving force behind the test was the Court’s concern with preemption. 
 
240. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 51, at 227–35; J. Gibson Lanier, Further 
Guidance and the Light at the End of the Tunnel, Smith, Gambrell, & 
Russell, LLP, http://www.sgrlaw.com/further-guidance-and-the-light-
at-the-end-of-the-tunnel/ [https://perma.cc/DF4V-5MNZ] (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2018); Alex E. Breger, ABA Sends Letter to USPTO Director 
Proposing Amendment to Resolve Ambiguity in § 101 Statutory 
Interpretation, Lando & Anastasi (Apr. 3, 2017), http://www.lalaw.com/ 
news_resources/aba-letter-to-uspto-director/ [https://perma.cc/3RCQ-
L8VG]; Gene Quinn, Supreme Court “Abstract Idea Doctrine” Is 
Unworkable, IPWatchdog (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/ 
2014/02/13/supreme-court-abstract-idea-doctrine-is-unworkable/id=47980/ 
[https://perma.cc/4R8S-AHN2]. 
241. Taylor, supra note 51, at 227. 
242. Id. (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, KSR Int’l v. Teleflex Inc., 
550 U.S. 398 (2007) (No. 04-1350)). 
243. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2415 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
244. Id. 
245. Id. at 2417 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)). 
246. Id. 
247. Id. at 2418. 
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There has been a recent bipartisan push for a legislative solution to 
the issues surrounding patent eligibility.248 In April 2019, Senators Tillis 
and Coons, as well as Representatives Collins, Johnson, and Stivers, 
released a draft outline of a potential legislative reform to patent 
eligibility.249 The proposed framework is a positive step towards 
resolving the current problems with patent eligibility. The draft 
includes proposals that claims should be considered as a whole and that 
the words “new and useful” be removed from the statute and replaced 
with a simple requirement that the invention meet existing statutory 
utility requirements.250 However, some language in the draft may 
perpetuate the current issues with patent eligibility, rather than resolve 
them. For example, the framework proposes to “statutorily abrogate 
judicially created exceptions to patent eligible subject matter in favor 
of exclusive statutory categories of ineligible subject matter.”251 The 
proposed statutory exceptions would include: fundamental scientific 
principles; products that exist solely and exclusively in nature; pure 
mathematical formulas; economic or commercial principles; and mental 
activities.252 These proposed statutory exceptions closely mirror the 
current judicially created exceptions: abstract ideas, natural 
phenomena, and laws of nature. Therefore, claims that are currently 
rejected as being directed to natural phenomena or laws of nature will 
likely continue to be rejected as being directed to a fundamental 
scientific principle. The proposed framework also includes a “‘practical 
application’ test to ensure that the statutorily ineligible subject matter 
is construed narrowly.”253 However, the current Mayo/Alice approach 
is already supposed to be construed narrowly, to avoid swallowing all 
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of patent law.254 Consequently, it seems unlikely that courts will 
narrowly construe the statutory exceptions when the current judicial 
exceptions are not narrowly construed. Furthermore, the framework 
includes the proposal that “simply reciting generic technical language 
or generic functional language does not salvage an otherwise ineligible 
claim.”255 This proposal echoes the Court’s finding in Mayo that “simply 
appending conventional steps, specified at a high level of generality, to 
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas cannot make 
those laws, phenomena, and ideas patentable.”256 Therefore, the 
amendment, as currently proposed, would likely be implemented in the 
same way the current Mayo/Alice test is implemented. Thus, the 
current proposed framework highlights the challenges that a legislative 
amendment is likely to face. 
Resorting to legislative amendment in an attempt to fix patent 
eligibility will provide, at best, a temporary solution to the chaos of the 
Mayo/Alice two-step. In its implementation of the current patent-
eligibility framework, the Court has largely ignored the text of section 
101, as well as the role of the other sections of the Patent Act. The 
Mayo/Alice two-step, however, is grounded, not in a solid 
interpretation of section 101, but in the Supreme Court’s patent policy 
agenda of preventing preemption.257 The Court appears to believe that 
the current approach to patent eligibility is the only way to eliminate 
overly broad patents that preempt the building blocks of technology.258 
Consequently, amending section 101 to overrule Mayo and Alice will 
not prevent the Supreme Court from interpreting the new statute in a 
manner that fits its policy agenda. This is of particular concern if the 
amendment incorporates language, as currently proposed, stating that 
generic technical or functional language will not salvage an otherwise 
ineligible claim.259 The Supreme Court has already embraced the idea 
that newly drafted patent statutes should be interpreted in a manner 
consistent with precedent; in Flook, the Supreme Court embraced the 
patent-eligibility standard developed in Funk Brothers in spite of the 
 
254. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (“we tread 
carefully in construing this exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of 
patent law”). 
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256. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 82 (2012). 
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intervening passage of the 1952 Patent Act.260 The Court reasoned, “[i]t 
is our duty to construe the patent statutes as they now read, in light 
of our prior precedents.”261 Similarly, a statutory amendment to section 
101 is likely to be read in light of the Court’s prior precedent in Mayo 
and Alice. Consequently, any reference in an amendment which is 
suggestive of the Court’s current eligibility test is likely to be read into 
the new statute, even if that was not the intent of the drafters. This is 
even more likely, despite its insistence that Congress should determine 
patent policy, since the Court seems more than willing to set its own 
policy agenda in regards to patent eligibility. 
Conclusion: Replacing the Mayo/Alice Two-Step 
In order to strengthen the U.S. patent system, encourage 
innovation, and foster advancements in life-saving technologies, a new 
standard for patent-eligibility needs to be established. To help ensure a 
stable, enforceable patent eligibility standard, the Supreme Court needs 
to realize the error in pushing their own policy on patent eligibility and 
replace the Mayo/Alice two-step with a new standard. This standard 
should be consistent with the text of section 101 and the Patent Act as 
a whole, as well as the patent policy embraced by Congress during the 
passage of the 1952 Patent Act. 
In replacing the Mayo/Alice two-step, the Court needs to expressly 
overrule its decisions in Mayo and Alice. Any attempt by the Court to 
continue to reconcile its conflicting precedent will result in drastic 
variation in the application of any new test as lower courts grapple with 
how to reconcile conflicting precedent. This variation in application will 
result in continued uncertainty surrounding patent eligibility. 
After overruling Mayo and Alice, the Court should establish a 
patent-eligibility test consistent with the Chakrabarty/Diehr precedent, 
which led to the rise of innovation and technology in the United States. 
The new eligibility test should depend on an analysis of the claims as a 
whole and not on individual claim elements. Under the new test, section 
101 should function as a gate-keeper and very coarse preemption filter. 
A determination of patent eligibility should begin with claim 
construction to determine the scope of the claims as a whole. The claims 
of a patent define a patentee’s property rights; they delineate what the 
invention is and what the patentee’s right to exclusion encompasses. 
Dissecting claims into individual elements in search of an inventive 
concept to transform patent-ineligible laws of nature into patent-eligible 
inventions ignores what the patentee is actually able to assert as a 
property right. If the driving force behind the exclusionary principle of 
section 101 is to prevent preemption of the basic building blocks of 
science and technology, the focus of the analysis should be on what the  
260. See supra notes 78–90 and accompanying text. 
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patentee’s exclusionary right encompasses. The patentee does not have 
an exclusionary right in each individual element of a claim, the 
exclusionary right lies in the claim as a whole. Consequently, to 
determine if a claim preempts a law of nature or abstract idea, judges 
must evaluate what a patentee is able to exclude the public from doing 
in regards to the claimed invention. 
The Court should also make clear that patent eligibility, while a 
legal question, has significant factual underpinnings. Dismissal or final 
judgment on claims prior to fact finding and formal claim construction 
is, therefore, improper. A correct understanding of the claims and the 
boundaries of a patentee’s property rights is essential to determining if 
the claim is directed to a law of nature, abstract idea, or natural 
phenomena. Despite current precedent, it is inconsistent with other 
patent law principles to interpret claims in a vacuum with no reference 
to the patent specification or prior art. Claim language is given its 
ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a person having 
ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA), in light of the specification.262 In 
interpreting claims, it is appropriate to rely on intrinsic and extrinsic 
evidence.263 Claim construction carries significant importance 
considering that district judges, who are charged with claim 
construction,264 are not PHOSITAs and will likely not understand the 
ordinary and customary meaning of claim language without context. 
Even PHOSITAs must interpret the claim in light of the specification. 
Furthermore, district judges rarely have technical backgrounds, which 
would aid them in claim construction, and even judges with specialized 
technical backgrounds may struggle with understanding technology 
outside of their area of expertise. A thorough understanding of the claim 
and the boundaries of a patentee’s property rights is critical to any 
analysis of patent validity.265 
Despite the importance of claim construction, some commentators 
and practitioners continue to advocate that determining patent 
eligibility prior to proper claim construction is necessary to save 
resources and increase judicial efficiency.266 Courts should not, however, 
be invalidating meritorious patents in the name of increasing judicial 
efficiency. If increasing judicial efficiency in patent law cases is needed, 
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other solutions, which do not invalidate good patents, should be 
implemented to address these concerns.267 
After claim construction, the Court should analyze patent eligibility 
by applying section 101 in the manner it was intended, as a coarse filter. 
Section 101 was not meant to be a burdensome, highly exclusionary 
test. Patent eligibility is the gateway to determining patentability and 
should let in everything except claims directed solely to the judicial 
exceptions of abstract ideas, laws of nature, or natural phenomenon; 
any applications of these exceptions, however, should be patent-eligible 
under section 101. The “machine-or-transformation” test, while not the 
only means of determining if a claim is directed solely to a judicial 
exception or an application of the exception, provides an important clue 
in this analysis. In readdressing patent eligibility, the Court should 
make clear that, despite pulling back on the exclusive use of the 
“machine-or-transformation” test in Bilski, the test is still applicable 
and should carry significant weight in determining eligibility. 
Finding a claim patent-eligible under section 101, however, does not 
mean the claim is patentable. A claim must still satisfy the written 
description, enablement, novelty, and non-obviousness requirements of 
the Patent Act. These statutory requirements for patentability should 
do the bulk of the work of determining a claims’ patentability on their 
own and not be lumped into a section 101 analysis. While section 101 
serves as a very coarse filter and excludes claims that attempt to 
preempt every use of a judicial exclusion, a finer tuned preemption 
analysis should be conducted under the written description and 
enablement requirement of section 112. As evidenced in Morse, which 
the Court has so heavily relied upon in pushing its current section 101 
analysis, the written description and enablement requirement are aptly 
suited for determining the scope of a claim and controlling the 
preemption of basic scientific ideas. Morse’s claim was invalid, not for 
being directed to ineligible subject matter, but because Morse failed to 
describe and enable the claim. Thus, the Court should leave section 101 
as a coarse filter to exclude claims that attempt to patent every use of 
a judicial exception and allow section 112 to address more nuanced 
concerns of claim scope and preemption. 
Patent eligibility should, additionally, not be used to analyze the 
novelty or non-obviousness of a claim. These patentability requirements 
are established in sections 102 and 103, respectively, and should not be 
erroneously conflated with a patent-eligibility analysis under the guise 
of an “inventive concept.” As opposed to the vague “inventive concept” 
found in the Mayo/Alice test, which the Supreme Court admits 
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overlaps with novelty and non-obviousness,268 analysis under sections 
102 and 103 is better defined and based on objective standards.269 The 
inventive concept should, therefore, be eliminated from eligibility 
analysis and this concern left to sections 102 and 103. While section 
101 mentions “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter,”270 the legislative history makes clear that the 
word “new” is duplicative of section 102, which outlines how to define 
novelty. The “inventive concept,” therefore, has no place in a patent 
eligibility analysis. 
In determining patent eligibility, Chakrabarty focused on the level 
of human intervention in the claimed invention. The Court should re-
embrace this element of the Chakrabarty approach to patent eligibility. 
Significant human intervention in a claim, along with the “machine-or-
transformation” test, provides critical insight into whether a claim is 
directed solely to a patent-ineligible judicial exception. Furthermore, 
assessing human intervention is consistent with the intention of the 
drafters of the 1952 Patent Act that everything under the sun made by 
man is patent eligible. 
The proposed patent-eligibility test effectively excludes claims 
directed solely to laws of nature, abstract ideas, and natural phenomena 
from patent protection. The test does, however, open the door to 
groundbreaking applications and uses of these ineligible concepts. 
Under the proposed test, a claim directed to Einstein’s theory of 
relativity would be found patent ineligible. A hypothetical claim 
directed to the theory of relativity reads as follows: 
 
A method for determining a kinetic energy E of a body, the method 
comprising the steps of: 
 
Calculating a value c2, wherein the value c2 is equal to the speed 
of light squared; 
Multiplying the value c2 by a value m, wherein the value m is 
equal to the mass of the body; and 
Wherein the kinetic energy E of the body is equal to a product 
of the value c2 multiplied by the value m. 
 
The claim, analyzed as a whole, is directed to calculating kinetic 
energy, which encompasses both an abstract idea—the algorithm—and 
a law of nature—kinetic energy. This claim would be excluded under 
section 101’s coarse filter because it preempts every use of calculating  
268. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 90 
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kinetic energy with the claimed algorithm. This claim illustrates, 
however, why no one tool for analyzing patent eligibility is dispositive; 
the claim is likely to pass the “machine-or-transformation” test because 
it “transforms” the raw data into a new form, the value of kinetic energy 
of a body. However, the claim preempts every use of the algorithm and 
has little human intervention and is, consequently, patent ineligible. 
Similarly, a claim directed to a newly discovered rock that claims a 
composition of matter comprised of individually listed elements, would 
also be found patent ineligible under the proposed test. Such a claim 
would preempt every use of the claimed composition, would fail the 
“machine-or-transformation” test, and would have no human 
intervention. A new application or method involving either of these 
claims would pass the proposed eligibility test and its patentability 
would be decided based on sections 112, 102, and 103. Similarly, while 
the claims in Mayo or Alice would pass section 101 analysis under the 
proposed test, the claims would be found invalid, as they originally 
should have been, under the other statutory requirements for 
patentability. 
The proposed eligibility test will help restore certainty to the U.S. 
patent system. The test involves a workable standard that is notably 
absent in the Mayo/Alice two-step. This workable standard will allow 
inventors and investors to have confidence in where to invest their time 
and resources. The proposed test will also protect valid, meritorious 
patents from the unwarranted invalidations that result from the current 
Mayo/Alice two-step. Patents directed to groundbreaking medical 
discoveries, such as Sequenom’s method for determining fetal 
abnormalities based on detection of cffDNA in maternal blood, would 
be found eligible under the proposed test. Protecting these types of 
groundbreaking innovations will promote further research and 
development in medical diagnostics and treatments. By replacing the 
Mayo/Alice two-step, the Supreme Court can restore the United States 
“gold-standard” patent protection and foster the development of life-
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